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Abstract—Current approaches to tackling the single point of
failure in SDN entail a distributed operation of SDN controller
instances. Their state synchronization process is reliant on the
assumption of a correct decision-making in the controllers. Suc-
cessful introduction of SDN in the critical infrastructure networks
also requires catering to the issue of unavailable, unreliable (e.g.
buggy) and malicious controller failures. We propose MORPH,
a framework tolerant to unavailability and Byzantine failures,
that distinguishes and localizes faulty controller instances and ap-
propriately reconfigures the control plane. Our controller-switch
connection assignment leverages the awareness of the source of
failure to optimize the number of active controllers and minimize
the controller and switch reconfiguration delays. The proposed
re-assignment executes dynamically after each successful failure
identification. We require 2FM+FA+1 controllers to tolerate FM
malicious and FA availability-induced failures. After a successful
detection of FM malicious controllers, MORPH reconfigures the
control plane to require a single controller message to forward
the system state. Next, we outline and present a solution to
the practical correctness issues related to the statefulness of the
distributed SDN controller applications, previously ignored in the
literature. We base our performance analysis on a resource-aware
routing application, deployed in an emulated testbed comprising
up to 16 controllers and up to 34 switches, so to tolerate up to 5
unique Byzantine and additional 5 availability-induced controller
failures (a total of 10 unique controller failures). We quantify and
highlight the dynamic decrease in the packet and CPU load and
the response time after each successful failure detection.
Keywords - Byzantine fault tolerance, SDN, distributed
control plane, reliability, availability, empirical study
I. INTRODUCTION
In a Software Defined Network (SDN), switches and routers
rely on a centralized SDN controller to provide the necessary
configurations for path finding and resource configuration. In
a single-controller SDN, the controller represents the sin-
gle point of failure. In case of a disabled or compromised
controller, the SDN control plane becomes inoperable. The
user faces the possibility of losing control over the network
equipment and hence risks the unavailability of the data plane
for new services. Indeed, the availability of the network control
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and management functions is of paramount importance in
industrial networks where critical network failures may lead
to disruption of applications, potentially leading to safety and
regulatory issues [1]–[3]. Hence, for the purpose of resilience,
a multitude of strategies for deploying parallel SDN controller
instances were proposed in the recent literature [4]–[8].
In state-of-the-art distributed SDN controller implementa-
tions [7], [8], a resilient control plane is established by a
controller-switch role-assignment procedure. In these architec-
tures, for each switch, exactly one controller is assigned the
role PRIMARY, and multiple backup controllers are assigned
the role SECONDARY. Hence, in the case of a critical failure
in the PRIMARY controller, a SECONDARY controller can
take over the failed PRIMARY controller’s switches. When
handling external requests such as switch events or client
requests, only a single controller is declared the PRIMARY
controller for a node. A good example is the addition of a
new flow service in the network. Here, a PRIMARY controller
may need to handle the request in the following manner:
1) If the PRIMARY controller receives the client request,
the task (e.g., path finding) is executed locally.
2) If a SECONDARY controller receives the client request,
the request is proxied by the SECONDARY to the PRI-
MARY controller, which then proceeds with request han-
dling. If the PRIMARY controller fails, a new PRIMARY
that handles the client request, is re-elected [9], [10].
However, an occurrence of a Byzantine failure of the PRI-
MARY controller (i.e. because of a corrupted [1], manipulated
[11], or buggy [12] internal state), may lead to incorrect
computation decisions in the controller logic. With Byzantine
failures, there is incomplete information on whether the con-
troller has truly failed. Thus, the controller may appear as both
failed and correct to the failure-detection systems, presenting
different symptoms to different observers (i.e. switches). Ad-
ditionally, a malicious adversary may interfere with or modify
the controller logic for the purpose of taking control of the
network or re-routing the network traffic [11].
On the other hand, availability-related controller failures
lead to the controllers becoming inactive. In contrast to
Byzantine failures, such controllers do not actively perform
malicious actions nor do they try to hide their real status.
Following an availability failure they stop reacting to accepting
client requests and eventually time out. Availability types
of failures are detected using failure detectors and not by
means of a semantic message comparison. Existing state-of-
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2the art works [13], [14], however, do not distinguish Byzantine
from availability-related failure sources, such as the failure of
the underlying hardware, hypervisor or data plane links that
interconnect the controllers. They consider the availability-
related failures a subset of Byzantine failures and thus tend
to overprovision the required number of controller instances.
The approach presented henceforth leverages a successful
discovery of controller failures and the cause of the failures,
in order to optimally adapt the number of deployed controllers
as well as the controller-switch assignments during runtime.
Our approach realizes a low-overhead control plane operation,
while protecting from mentioned types of faults at all times.
A. Our Contribution
We handle the Byzantine faults by modeling the controller
instances of the distributed SDN control plane as a set
of Replicated State Machines (RSMs). MORPH proposes a
dynamic re-association of the controller-switch connections
after detecting a fault injected by a malicious adversary or
an availability-related failure of an SDN controller instance.
Depending on the network operator’s preference, instead of
contacting just the PRIMARY controllers, the edge switches
may also forward the client requests to both PRIMARY and
SECONDARY controllers (i.e. using an OpenFlow packet-
in message [15]) in order to request additional responses,
computed by the isolated controller instances. The switch
then collects the different responses and evaluates them for
inconsistencies. Since the controllers are modeled as RSMs,
each correct controller is expected to compute the exact same
response for any given input request. The SECONDARY
controllers may forward their configuration messages either
proactively, or reactively, when inconsistencies in the con-
figuration messages are detected in the switch. Finally, each
switch deduces the correct decision locally, based on the
minimum number of required consistent (matching) controller
configuration messages.
In MORPH, we introduce three architectural components:
i) REASSIGNER - detects the controller failures, differenti-
ates the types of failures and reassigns the controller-switch
connections on a detected failure; ii) S-COMPARATOR -
the switch component that compares the controller responses
for the purpose of detection of inconsistent configurations;
iii) C-COMPARATOR - the controller agent which compares
controller-to-controller messages in order to identify incon-
sistent state synchronization messages. The comparators addi-
tionally apply the controller-switch assignment lists provided
by the REASSIGNER. The REASSIGNER recomputes the
controller-switch lists, with the objective of minimizing the
amount of considered controllers in deduction of new configu-
ration and thus reducing the worst-case waiting period required
to confirm any new switch configuration.
We introduce the dynamic controller-switch reassignment
procedure that optimally assigns the controllers to switches
and makes strict guarantees for the QoS constraints, such as
the maximum controller-to-switch and controller-to-controller
delays and the controller processing capacity. MORPH solves
the controller-switch assignment problem during online oper-
ation using an Integer Linear Program (ILP) formulation. As a
consequence, our switch agent applies the internal reconfigura-
tions after receiving a maximum of FM+1 consistent/matching
controller messages, thus minimizing the response time com-
pared to [14] and [13] which require a minimum of 3F + 1
and F + 1 consistent messages to forward the switch state at
any point in time, respectively. In MORPH, FM denotes the
maximum number of tolerated Byzantine failures, whereas FA
represents the number of maximum tolerated unavailability-
induced failures. In common state-of-the-art literature, this
differentiation is not done, hence, there F denotes the num-
ber of tolerated combined Byzantine and availability-induced
failures. The switches in MORPH require a minimum of one
controller message to apply the internal reconfigurations, after
FM malicious controllers are detected in the system.
In our evaluation, we conclude that the dynamic reassign-
ment of controller-switch connections results in a considerable
performance improvement in: i) the observed best- and worst-
case response time in controller-to-switch and controller-to-
controller communication; ii) a decrease in generated packet
load and iii) a decrease in experienced CPU load.
The performance analysis of our implementation comprises
a varied set of maximum tolerated controller failures. Measure-
ments were executed on two well-known large- and medium-
sized service provider and data-center topologies. The em-
ulated testbed comprised distributed MORPH processes and
Open vSwitch instances and is thus a realistic approximation
of the expected actual performance.
We structure the paper as follows. Important terminology is
introduced in Sec. II. The state-of-the-art literature is presented
in Sec. III. Sec. IV highlights the practical correctness issues
related to the relevant state-of-the-art BFT approaches [13],
[14]. In Sec. V we introduce the MORPH architecture. Sec.
VI-A presents the algorithms implemented by MORPH. Sec.
VI-B details the ILP formulation for the dynamic controller-
switch assignment procedure. Sec. VII outlines our evaluation
methodology. We present the evaluation results in Sec. VIII.
Finally, Sec. IX concludes this paper.
II. TERMINOLOGY
To clarify the issues with the existing approaches, we
introduce the following important concepts:
• A malicious controller is an active controller in possession
of a malicious adversary. It is able to compute correct and
incorrect responses to the client requests and propose the
according configurations to the switches. It may disguise
itself as a correct controller for an arbitrary period of
time. In our model, unreliable controllers that compute
an incorrect result as a consequence of a buggy internal
state are also considered "malicious". Until suspected, all
malicious controllers are considered correct.
• A correct controller is an active controller instance which is
not malicious and which actively participates in the cluster
of MORPH controllers.
• An unavailable controller is a disabled controller which is
not active as a result of a hardware/software failure. It is
unknown if an unavailable controller was either correct or
malicious at some point in time before its failure.
3• An incorrect controller is a controller that is either malicious
or unavailable.
• State-independent (SIA) SDN applications: We refer to SDN
applications that do not require the inter-controller state
synchronization as state-independent applications (SIA), e.g.
shortest path routing without resource guarantees, controller-
supported MAC-learning, load balancing etc.
• State-dependent (SDA) SDN applications: For reservation-
based applications, state synchronization between the con-
trollers is necessary to generate correct new decisions for
requests which rely on decisions made in the past (i.e. the
causality property). We refer to these types of applications as
state-dependent applications (SDA), e.g. reservation-based
path finding and resource management [16], flow schedul-
ing, optimal and reservation-aware load balancing [17] etc.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we present the related work in the context
of Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) research in SDN.
The prominent open-source SDN platforms such as Open-
Daylight [7] and ONOS [8] support no means of identifying
Byzantine failures in the controller cluster. However, they do
implement measures to support controller fail-over in the face
of availability-induced failures. More specifically, ONOS and
OpenDaylight allow for replication of the controller state in
a strong and eventually consistent manner [18], [19], so to
provide for availability of the data-store knowledge in the
SECONDARY controllers, after a failure of a PRIMARY.
Their strong consistent data-store is based on RAFT consensus
algorithm [9], [20], [21]. RAFT is, however, susceptible to
Byzantine failures, as only a single leader is elected at a
time by design. The RAFT leader processes and broadcasts
any new data-store updates to the followers before an update
may be considered committed. This introduces multiple attack
vectors, e.g.: i) the adversary may generate malicious state
updates in each follower if the leader controller is in the
possession of a malicious adversary; ii) inconsistencies in the
state view [17] of master and followers if adversary takes over
the RAFT follower; iii) incorrectness issues, e.g., a continuous
non-convergence of controller cluster leadership [22].
The definition of the problem of malicious SDN controller
instances, including an initial solution draft, was proposed
in [14]. The authors discuss the requirement of a minimum
assignment of 3F+1 controllers to each switch at all times,
so to tolerate a total number of F Byzantine failures. 3F+1
matching messages are required during the agreement and
2F+1 during the execution phase in order to reach the majority
and consensus on the correct response after the comparison of
the computed configuration outputs [23].
BFT-SMaRt [4] proposes a strong consistent framework for
supporting Byzantine- and availability-induced failures. The
authors abstract away the notion of a "failure" to consider
controllers failed, if either the controller process crashes and
never recovers or the controller keeps infinitely crashing and
recovering. Their follow-up work [24] applies the Bft-SMaRt
in order to improve the data-store replication performance in a
strong consistent SDN. They evaluate the workload generated
by real SDN applications as they interact with the data-store.
Both works do not consider the issue of malicious
controller-to-controller synchronization, where a controller
may initiate malicious state synchronization procedure and
thus commit malicious database changes in the correct con-
trollers. Furthermore, they do not cover for the aspects of an
adaptive controller-switch connection reassignment procedure
nor do they distinguish and leverage the difference between
the Byzantine and availability-related controller failures.
A recent proposal for a BFT-enabled SDN [13] advocates
the usage of a total of 2F+1 instead of 3F+1 controller in-
stances. The authors propose the collection of F+1 PRIMARY
controller configuration messages at each switch (generated
by their PRIMARY controllers), and a delayed request to the
remaining F SECONDARY instances if an inconsistency is
detected in the switch. The configuration message is flagged as
correct only after a minimum of F+1 matching configurations
were received in the switch. The authors do not consider the
source of failure nor the effect of their design on the controller
state synchronization process.
IV. ISSUES WITH THE CURRENT DESIGNS
Apart from the inefficiency issues related to the unnecessary
control plane packet load during normal (non-faulty) operation
in [14] and [13], we have identified multiple correctness-
related issues not addressed by these works:
Inadequate constellation of controllers: The 2F+1 mode
of configuration leads to an incorrect decision-making when
correct instances become unavailable due to a controller-to-
switch link, controller-to-controller link or a controller in-
stance failure because of an availability-related issue, previous
to the identification of F of the remaining F+1 active instances
as malicious. Namely, the switch may incorrectly interpret the
majority of Byzantine messages as correct. Depending on the
design choice, after receiving F+1 inconsistent (non-matching)
controller replies, the switch may decide to not accept any
future configuration sent by the remaining active controllers
or worse, accept the proposed malicious configuration (the
majority configuration) as the valid configuration. Either de-
sign results in an unavailability and/or incorrectness of the
system after one correct replica has failed/or is unreachable
because of the unavailability preceding the activation of the
malicious controller replicas. Thus, both the number and
the order and type of failures matter for the correct failure
localization. Our approach requires an initial deployment and
switch-controller assignment of 2FM + FA + 1 controllers to
tolerate FM malicious adversary- and FA availability-induced
failures (assuming this the total request processing capacity
constraint holds). During the runtime, we dynamically adapt
the remaining number of assigned controllers according to the
number and type of detected controller failure.
Insecure controller-to-controller channel: The existing ap-
proaches do not address the issue of securing the controller-
to-controller communication. For SDA applications, letting a
malicious controller compute a correct operation and distribute
the Byzantine state changes (e.g. reservations) to the remaining
controllers may result in committing those malicious state
changes into the data-stores of the correct controller instances.
4The issue is exacerbated when reservation values (i.e. the
bandwidth and buffer reservations, flow table occupancies
etc.) are exchanged between controller instances for the pur-
pose of enabling resilience for mission-critical communication
services. Namely, the global controller decisions potentially
stretch across switches under control of different administra-
tive controller clusters, with each active controller requiring a
consistent global state to achieve optimal decision-making.
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Fig. 1. State-dependent applications: Issue of making incorrect decisions
or non-convergence on the new switch configuration when fetching SEC-
ONDARY controller responses.
Distinguishing false positives for SDA: Requesting the
computation of F SECONDARY controller configuration re-
sponses in addition to the collected F+1 PRIMARY responses,
without reasoning about the state awareness, may lead to an
incorrect identification of malicious controllers.
A problem scenario is depicted in Fig. 1. According to [13],
given an input request R1, PRIMARY controllers compute a
consistent switch configuration C1 at time T1. The switch
accepts the configuration C1 only if F+1 PRIMARY replicas
have computed a consistent result. As this is the case for R1,
the switch commits the new configuration C1 at time T2.
Similarly, the PRIMARY controllers update their controller
state according to the configuration C1. Let the client request
R2 arrive at the PRIMARY controllers at time T2. The
PRIMARY controllers handle the request and forward the
computed correct and Byzantine configurations C2 and C2′,
respectively, to the switches. The configuration is inconsistent,
hence the switches decide to request a recomputation of the
result for request R2 at the SECONDARY controllers at time
T3. Since the SECONDARY controllers have never observed
the updated view of the internal data-store as a result of the
changes related to C1, they compute a configuration C2′′ at
T4 that differs from the correct configuration C2 computed at
the correct PRIMARY controllers at T2. Thus, the switches
are unable to distinguish correct from incorrect controllers at
T5 as F+1 consistent results may not be deducible. More
importantly, the switches may mistake correct for malicious
controllers (false positives). This is realistic in the scenario
where the majority of PRIMARY controllers assigned to the
affected switch are malicious.
V. MORPH SYSTEM MODEL
We next introduce our system model and architecture
in more detail and explain the novel system elements. As
our starting point, we consider a typical SDN architecture
where the data plane (i.e. networking elements/switches) and
control plane are separated [15]. We extend it with addi-
tional functional elements to enable a BFT and unavailability-
tolerant system operation. The control plane communication
between the switches and controllers (S2C, C2S) and be-
tween controllers (C2C) is realized via an in-band control
channel [25]. Furthermore, all the communication between
different elements (i.e. REASSIGNER, C-COMPARATOR
and S-COMPARATOR) is assumed to be signed [26]. Thus
i) message forging is assumed impossible and ii) message
integrity is ensured in the data plane during normal operation.
In order to prevent a faulty replica from impersonating a
correct replica, correct replicas can authenticate each message
using MAC authentication [27], [28].
A. Design Goals
The proposed architecture is designed to accomplish two
major objectives, i) data plane protection from incorrect con-
trollers and ii) re-adaptation to the optimal network configu-
ration w.r.t. controller-to-switch connection assignments based
on the present number of correct and incorrect controllers.
i) Data plane protection: Even if there are up to FM
malicious controllers and FA failed controllers in the network,
the data plane networking elements must never be incorrectly
reconfigured or tampered with by the incorrect controllers.
MORPH realizes this protection by leveraging replicated com-
putation of control plane decisions and their transmission from
multiple controllers to the target switches. Hence, each switch
is connected to multiple controllers at the same time, and only
accepts and proceeds to commit the reconfiguration requests
if a sufficient number of matching messages for reaching the
correct consensus was received. If we consider a scenario
where FM malicious controllers send their reconfiguration
requests to the networking elements, it becomes clear that
we need at least FM + 1 correct reconfiguration requests in
order to enable the controllers to reach a correct consensus
and for the switches to distinguish a correct reconfiguration
request from an inconsistent message set. For the detection of
an unavailability-induced controller failure, we deploy a failure
detector [29], [30] that reliably identifies the fail-silent con-
trollers [31]. Hence, in the case of a failure of FA controllers,
we only require one additional backup instance (i.e. FA+1) to
achieve a correct control plane protection. Therefore, in order
to protect the data plane from FM malicious controllers and
FA failed controllers each switch has to be assigned to at least
|C| = 2FM +FA+1 controllers. Granted, a switch will accept
the new reconfiguration request already after receiving FM+1
matching messages from the controllers.
Additionally, individual switch failures may cause packet
loss and thus an unsuccesful delivery of controller messages. If
a faulty switch on the control path starts dropping controllers’
messages, the next-in-line switches and dislocated controllers
5eventually start suspecting failed connections to the unreach-
able controllers. The switches eventually raise an alarm at the
REASSIGNER. The REASSIGNER then accordingly marks
the unreachable controllers as "unavailable". Only a limited
number of "unavailable" controllers is tolerated by our design
(governed by the FA parameter). Thus, both failures coming
from unavailable controllers, as well as from the unavailable
switches that forward the control packets to-and-from unreach-
able controllers are accounted by same parameter FA.
ii) Re-adaptation to the optimal network configuration:
After the detection of a failed or malicious controller, the
tamper-proof entity REASSIGNER recomputes the controller-
to-switch connection assignments in order to achieve the
optimal network configuration given the current number of
correct and incorrect controllers. The recomputed assignments
are distributed to the controllers and switches in order to
reduce the reconfiguration delay and messaging overhead in
the control plane. The definition of the optimal configuration
of a network and the reassignment logic is elaborated in
Section VI-B.
B. System Elements in MORPH
In order to establish and evaluate the mentioned design
goals, the following elements are considered and introduced
in the MORPH system architecture depicted in Fig. 2.
Northbound (NBI) and data plane clients: The SDN
application clients requesting a particular controller service.
NBI clients are aware of the controllers but not of their
roles w.r.t. switch assignment. Thus, NBI clients report their
requests to all available controllers. The data plane clients feed
their requests to a well-defined controller group address. The
data plane client requests are then handled by the neighboring
edge switch and are encapsulated as a packet-in message (e.g.
using OpenFlow [15]) and delivered only to the PRIMARY
and SECONDARY controllers of that particular switch.
S-COMPARATOR: A switch mechanism that collects and
compares the configuration outputs generated at each ac-
tive PRIMARY or SECONDARY controller instance asso-
ciated with the switch hosting the C-COMPARATOR in-
stance. On discovery of inconsistencies, the S-COMPARATOR
reports the conflicting configurations to the REASSIGNER
entity. We assume a tamper-proof operation of the S-
COMPARATOR (e.g., realized using the Intel SGX enclaves
[32]). S-COMPARATOR cannot be implemented with current
OpenFlow logic, but requires one additional software agent,
responsible for comparison of arriving control messages. This
requirement is, however, not unique to MORPH and holds
for any BFT-enabled system where switches take over the
comparison logic, including [13] and [14]. Advances of pro-
grammable switching hardware and languages, such as P4
[33], could enable for a more flexible implementations of S-
COMPARATOR. A running instance of S-COMPARATOR is
assumed in each active switch in MORPH deployment (refer
to Fig. 2).
C-COMPARATOR: A controller mechanism that collects
and compares the controller configuration messages generated
at each active controller instance. In the controller hosting
SDA applications, it withholds the propagation of switch
configuration messages as long as the majority of controller
updates remains inconsistent. After collecting a majority of
consistent messages, it updates the underlying controller’s
internal state configuration to reflect the configuration update
(e.g., it updates the status of resource reservations). A running
instance of C-COMPARATOR is assumed in each active
controller in MORPH deployment (ref. Fig. 2).
REASSIGNER: The REASSIGNER is in charge of de-
tecting the incorrect controllers. It is furthermore able to
find an optimal controller-to-switch assignment so to exclude
the incorrect controllers and report the updated controller-
switch list assignments at the controllers and switches. The
REASSIGNER is triggered every time a controller is suspected
by an S-COMPARATOR. The trigger is executed independent
of the cause of failure (i.e. the discovery of a Byzantine or
unavailable controller). However, the effect of discovery of the
cause of failure considerably affects the selection of controllers
considered in the assignment. The proposed controller-switch
assignment solver is aware of the free capacities of the
controllers as well as of the worst-case delays between the
controllers and switches and in between the controllers, and is
able to consider the related worst-case bounds when executing
an optimal assignment. We detail the assignment procedure in
Sec. VI-B. We cannot trust a single REASSIGNER instance
to be correct. To make the REASSIGNER resistant against
malicious and availability failures, similarly to controllers, it
must be implemented as a group of replicas that also carry out
a BFT agreement protocol after each successful reassignment.
For brevity, in the rest of the paper, we assume a tamper-proof
operation of the REASSIGNER (e.g., realized using the Intel
SGX enclaves [32]) and focus our attention on solving the
Byzantine faults in the context of SDN controllers only.
REQ1
NBI Client
REQ1
REQ1
REQ1
RES1
RES1
RES1
RES1
REASSIGNER
Data-Plane 
Client
REQ2
REQ2
REQ2
REQ2
- Client-Controller Channel
- Controller-Controller Channel
- PRIMARY Controller - Switch Channel
- SECONDARY Controller - Switch Channel
- REASSIGNER - C-COMPARATOR Channel
- REASSIGNER - S-COMPARATOR Channel
S-COMP
C-COMP
C-COMP
C-COMPC-COMP
S-COMP
S-COMP
S-COMP
S-COMP
S-COMP
Fig. 2. MORPH architecture comprising the: i) SDN controllers that host
the C-COMPARATOR; ii) switches that host the S-COMPARATOR; iii)
northbound (NBI) and data plane clients; and iv) REASSIGNER element.
REASSIGNER is in charge of dynamically recomputing the controller-switch
assignment after a reported controller failure discovery by S-COMPARATOR.
6C. Application Types
We distinguish two different types of SDN applica-
tions, state-independent (SIA) and state-dependent applica-
tions (SDA). SIA refers to all SDN applications which process
client’s requests independent of the actual network state.
Hence, given a repeated client input, a correct SIA application
always generates a constant, semantically equal response.
One representative of SIA is the hop-based shortest path
routing where, assuming no topology changes, the shortest
path between the hosts remains the same, regardless of the
current link and node utilization. Contrary to SIA, SDA refers
to all applications which base their decision-making on the
current network state. Hence, if we consider typical load
balancing routing, two identical requests (e.g. path requests)
could generate completely different responses (i.e. different
routes) from the controller, so to optimize for the total current
resource utilization given the instantaneous network state.
D. Necessity of the Controller State Synchronization
Consensus across SDA instances: In a resource-based SDA,
such as a routing application, where the cost of each link
depends on the current network state (e.g. link utilization),
the problem might arise if two scattered clients (e.g. client A
and client B) request the same path to distributed controllers
at approximately the same time. Due to the propagation and
processing delays, the controllers in the proximity of client A
and the controllers in the proximity of client B could process
the corresponding requests in a non-deterministic order. Since
the network state is updated after processing each request, even
the correct controllers could produce inconsistent responses to
the switches. MORPH solves this problem by delaying the
correct controllers’ configuration responses to the switches
until a sufficient number of controller messages generated
by PRIMARY and SECONDARY set, required to reach a
common consensus for the client request, is collected. In order
to achieve the consensus: i) all PRIMARY and SECONDARY
controllers first compute a response immediately after receiv-
ing the client request; ii) they next store it in an internal
database and; iii) exchange their decisions using the any-to-
any C2C channels. Finally, the consensus is reached for a
controller’s C-COMPARATOR component when it receives
at least b(ReqP + ReqS)/2c + 1 identical responses for a
given request, where ReqP is the current number of required
PRIMARY controllers and ReqS is the current number of
required SECONDARY controller assignments per switch.
Proxying mechanism in SDA and SIA instances: Further-
more, both in the SDA and SIA routing applications, the
establishment of certain long paths is not achievable without
the C2C state synchronization. For example, a client could
initiate a routing request via its neighbouring edge switch SA
to the set of SA’s PRIMARY and SECONDARY controllers.
However, if the determined path contains a switch which is
not assigned to the same set of PRIMARY and SECONDARY
controllers as with SA, the configuration of the flow rules by
the computing controller would not be allowed. Therefore,
when an actual controller, which is assigned the role of
PRIMARY or SECONDARY controller for the target switch,
compares and validates the new configuration on the C2C
channel, it decides to dispatch a response to the affected
switches. The proxying mechanism could alternatively be
omitted by enforcing the edge switch to forward the requests
for SDN applications that operate globally on the data plane, to
all available controllers. However, this design intuitively does
not scale well with the number of controllers as the processing
power of controllers and switches is limited [34].
VI. ENABLING BFT OPERATION OF A DISTRIBUTED SDN
CONTROL PLANE
Next we detail the system flow and the algorithms behind
MORPH. In the second part, we formulate the objectives
and constraints for the Integer Linear Program (ILP) that
dynamically reassigns the controller-switch connections during
runtime, as part of the REASSIGNER logic.
A. Algorithm
The attached algorithms describe the operation of MORPH
in more detail. A simplified visual representation and system
workflow involving the introduced algorithms is provided in
Fig. 3. We distinguish the following eight steps:
1) Given a list of controllers and switches, as well as the
list of clients and their worst-case capacity requirements,
REASSIGNER executes the initial assignment of control
plane connections. It considers the unidirectional delay as
well as the controller capacity constraint. As described in
Sec. VI-B, the REASSIGNER minimizes the total number
of active controllers when assigning switches to controllers.
This process is embodied in Lines 1-2 of Alg. 1.
2) The controller-switch assignment lists are distributed to the
SDN controllers and switches. Switches are thus assigned
their PRIMARY and SECONDARY controllers. From now
on, any received configuration message initiated by a
remote controller is queued for the evaluation in the switch
if and only if the configuration message was initiated
by a controller that belongs to either the PRIMARY or
SECONDARY controller set of that switch. Otherwise, the
configuration message is rejected and dropped.
3) An end-client sends off their request to the SDN controller,
i.e. a request for a computation of a QoS-constrained path,
a load-balancing request etc. Northbound clients send their
requests directly to all controllers, while data plane clients
stay unaware of the location of the controllers, so to sim-
plify the client-side / user logic [35]. The data plane clients
feed their requests directly into the network. The next-hop
edge switch then intercepts and proxies the request to its
assigned PRIMARY and SECONDARY controllers.
4) The PRIMARY and SECONDARY controllers of the
switch which initiated the client request compute the cor-
responding configuration response and decide to apply the
computed response configuration in the affected switches.
We enable the selection of a flexible trade-off between
the switch configuration time overhead (response time) and
the generated control plane load. In general, the controller
instances assigned to a switch are either of the PRIMARY
or the SECONDARY role. Depending on the point in time
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Fig. 3. A simplified visual representation of the system workflow and the distributed algorithm execution as defined in Sec. VI-A. The portrayed
workflow depicts the steps of: (1-2) controller-switch assignment; (3-5) client request dissemination and handling in the PRIMARY and SECONDARY
C-COMPARATOR instances; (6-7, 8-10) dissemination and handling of PRIMARY and SECONDARY controller responses in the affected S-COMPARATOR
instances, respectively; (11-12, 13-14) dissemination and handling of Byzantine and/or availability-induced failures in the REASSIGNER, respectively.
the SECONDARY controller instances decide to forward
the computed configuration responses to their switches, the
overhead in terms of response time and control plane load
may vary. Therefore, we define the following two models:
• NON-SELECTIVE: Propagation of computed configura-
tions from SECONDARY controllers to switches initi-
ates immediately after receiving the client request. In
case of the SDA, new configurations are sent to switches
only after reaching the majority consensus on the new
configuration message, as explained later in the text.
• SELECTIVE model imposes an additional step of buffer-
ing the intermediate result (either locally computed in the
case of SIA or the majority result in the case of SDA
applications) and forwarding the result to the switch on-
demand, whenever the switch requests additional config-
uration messages from its SECONDARY controllers.
In the case of the SELECTIVE model, only the con-
trollers which are the PRIMARY controllers of the to-be-
configured switches forward their request directly to the
switch. In the case of the NON-SELECTIVE model, the
SECONDARY controllers also proactively forward their
configuration messages to the switches. This differentiation
is depicted in Lines 9-16 of the SIA-specific Alg. 2 and
Lines 11-18 of the SDA-specific Alg. 3.
State-independent applications (SIA): In case of SIA, the
controllers forward the computed configuration messages
to the target switches if they are assigned either the
PRIMARY or SECONDARY role for the target switch. If
the controller that computes the configuration is assigned
neither role for the target switch, the configuration result is
forwarded to the switch only after a consensus is achieved
on the actual PRIMARY/SECONDARY controllers of the
switch. For SIA, consensus is achieved after collecting
ReqP identical messages on the PRIMARY/SECONDARY
instances. ReqP denotes the currently required number of
assigned PRIMARY controllers per switch.
State-dependent applications (SDA): In case of SDA, all
correct controllers must first reach consensus on their
common internal state update. To this end, they deduce
the majority configuration message (in Lines 8-9 of Alg.
3). Majority configuration response is necessary in or-
der to omit the possibility of false positive detection,
where correct controllers potentially become identified as
faulty instances, following a temporary controller state de-
synchronization during runtime, as discussed in Sec. IV.
After determining the majority response, the controllers
send the configuration message to the switches (as in Lines
10-16 of Alg. 3). For SDA, the total number of required
matching messages to apply a controller-state update is
b(ReqP +ReqS)/2c+1, where ReqS denotes the currently
required number of assigned SECONDARY controllers per
switch. The total number of exchanged messages is the
same as in SIA, however, reaching a consensus before dis-
patching the configuration messages increases the overall
reconfiguration time, as shown in Section VIII.
The controllers that serve the client request synchronize
their configuration messages with the PRIMARY and SEC-
ONDARY controllers of the affected switch. Thus, the
PRIMARY and SECONDARY controllers of the affected
switch apply new switch configurations only after a suffi-
cient number of matching messages were generated at the
remote controller cluster members that have executed the
computation. Alternatively, the switches may distribute the
client requests to ALL SDN controllers and thus omit the
round trip resulting from the corner-case described above.
This incurs an additional message load for any case that is
not the corner-case situation described above.
85) The S-COMPARATORS collect the configuration requests
and decide after ReqP consistent (equal) PRIMARY mes-
sages to apply the configuration locally. In the SELECTIVE
scenario where inconsistent messages among the ReqP
PRIMARY messages are detected, the switches contact the
SECONDARY replicas to fetch additional ReqS responses
- as depicted in Line 10 of Alg. 4. After receiving ReqP
consistent (equal) messages (Line 12-15 of Alg. 4), the
switches apply the new configuration (Line 15). Thus, the
overhead of collection of ReqP consistent messages dic-
tates the worst-case for applying new switch configurations.
6) After discovery of an inconsistency among the controller
responses (Lines 9-10 of Alg. 4) or a failure of an assigned
controller (Line 24-25), the S-COMPARATORS wait until
ReqP+ReqS messages are collected, before addressing the
REASSIGNER with the controller IDs and the conflicting
messages (Line 20 of Alg. 4). In the case when a controller
instance has failed, the duration of the time the switch
waits before contacting the REASSIGNER corresponds
to the worst-case failure detection period (dictated by
the underlying failure detector, e.g. the φ-Accrual [29]
detector). If a switch suspects that a controller assigned
to it has failed, it notifies the REASSIGNER as per Line
25 of Alg. 4 and Line 13 of Alg. 1.
7) The REASSIGNER compares the inputs and deduces the
majority of correct responses received for the conflicting
client request. If a Byzantine failure of a controller is
suspected, both ReqP and ReqS are decremented by one
for each malicious controller. If a controller is marked
as unavailable (independent of the source of failure and
correctness of the controller), only the required number of
SECONDARY controllers per-switch ReqS is decremented
by one. Lines 4-17 of Alg. 1 contain this differentiation.
8) Based on the updated ReqP and ReqS controllers de-
duced during runtime, the REASSIGNER computes the
new optimal assignment and configures the switches and
controllers with the new controller-switch assignment lists.
Steps 3-7 repeat until all FM malicious and FA unavailable
controllers are eventually identified.
By lowering the number of maximum required PRIMARY
and SECONDARY controller assignments per switch, the
REASSIGNER minimizes the total control plane overhead in
terms of the packet exchange in both controller-to-controller
and controller-to-switch channels, as well as the time required
to confirm new controller and switch state configurations.
B. REASSIGNER Logic (Integer Linear Program)
REASSIGNER assigns the controller roles to switches on
a per-switch basis. It takes a list of controllers and switches,
their unidirectional delay and delay requirements, as well as
the list of clients and the client request arrival rates as input.
For brevity, we henceforth define a single objective for the
assignment problem. Namely, the REASSIGNER minimizes
the number of active controllers, so to lower the total overhead
of controller-to-controller communication, while taking into
consideration the maximum delay bound and available con-
troller capacities when assigning the controllers to switches.
Algorithm 1 REASSIGNER: Controller-switch assignment
Notation:
S Set of available SDN switches
C Set of available SDN controllers
B Set of detected blacklisted SDN controllers
Ap Set of PRIMARY controller-switch assignments
As Set of SECONDARY controller-switch assignments
ReqP No. of required PRIMARY controllers per switch
ReqS No. of req. SECONDARY controllers per switch
FM Maximum number of tolerated malicious controller
failures
FA Maximum number of tolerated unavailability
controller failures
Initial variables:
ReqP = FM + 1
ReqS = FA + FM
1: procedure CONTROLLER-SWITCH ASSIGNMENT
2: (Ap,As) := Assign-Controllers (S, C)
3:
4: upon event suspect-byzantine < Cm > do
5: C ← C \ Cm
6: B ← B ∪ Cm
7: ReqP = ReqP − 1
8: ReqS = ReqS − 1
9: (Ap,As) := Assign-Controllers (S, C, ReqP , ReqS)
10: signal (S, new-assignment< Ap,As >)
11: signal (C, new-assignment< Ap,As,B >)
12:
13: upon event controller-failed < Cf > do
14: C ← C \ Cf
15: B ← B ∪ Cm
16: ReqS = ReqS − 1
17: (Ap,As) := Assign-Controllers (S, C, ReqP , ReqS)
18: signal (S, new-assignment< Ap,As >)
19: signal (C, new-assignment< Ap,As,B >)
The mentioned objective additionaly allows for implicit load-
balancing of individual controller-switch connections, as long
as all controllers are instantiated with an equal initial capacity.
Let APCi,Sj and A
S
Ci,Sj
denote the active assignment
of a controller instance Ci to the switch Sj as a PRI-
MARY/SECONDARY controller, respectively. Then UCi de-
notes the active participation of the controller Ci in the system:
UCi =
1 when
∑
Sj∈S
APCi,Sj +
∑
Sj∈S
ASCi,Sj > 0,∀Ci ∈ C
0 otherwise
(1)
The objective function can then be formalized as:
min
∑
Ci∈C
UCi (2)
In the following, we define the constraints of the corre-
sponding ILP.
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independent application (SIA) requests in the SDN controller
Notation:
P Client request (e.g. flow request) initiated at switch SC
C The set of available SDN controllers
Ci The local controller instance
Cr The remote controller instance
RP,Si Configuration response intended for switch Si
Ap Set of primary controller-switch assignments
As Set of secondary controller-switch assignments
ASi,Ci Connection assignment variable for controller-
switch pair (Si, Ci)
1: procedure HANDLE CLIENT REQUEST
2: upon event packet-in < SC , P > do
3: RP := handle-packet-in (P )
4: signal (C, response-sync< Ci, RP >)
5:
6: upon event response-sync < Cr, RP > do
7: if is-sia-consensus-reached(RP ) or Ci == Cr then
8: for all Si ∈ affected-switches(RP ) do
9: if mode == non-selective then
10: if ASi,Ci ∈ Ap ∪ As then
11: signal (Si, response < Ci, RP,Si >)
12: else if mode == selective then
13: if ASi,Ci ∈ Ap then
14: signal (Si, response < Ci, RP,Si >)
15: else if ASi,Ci ∈ As then
16: store-secondary-response(RP,Si)
17:
18: upon event response-request < Si, P > do
19: signal (Si, response < Ci, RP,Si >)
Minimum Assignment Constraint: In order to tolerate FM
Byzantine and FA unavailability failures, initially at time t = 0
the REASSIGNER assigns ReqP (0) = FM + 1 PRIMARY
controllers, and ReqS(0) = FM + FA SECONDARY con-
trollers per each switch. The values ReqP and ReqS are
time-variant and are adapted on every discovered Byzan-
tine/availability failure or a successful controller recovery:
∑
Ci∈C
APCi,Sj ≥ ReqP (t),∀Sj ∈ S∑
Ci∈C
ASCi,Sj ≥ ReqS(t),∀Sj ∈ S
(3)
Unique Assignment Constraint: Each controller Ci may
either be assigned the role of a PRIMARY or SECONDARY,
at maximum once per switch Sj :
APCi,Sj +A
S
Ci,Sj ≤ 1,∀Ci ∈ C, Sj ∈ S (4)
Controller Capacity Constraint: Let PCi denote the total
available controller’s Ci capacity. Let LCLk and LSj denote
the load stemming from the northbound client CLk and the
data plane edge switch Sj , respectively. The sum of the
loads generated by the assigned switches at controller Ci may
Algorithm 3 C-COMPARATOR: Handling of state-dependent
application (SDA) requests in the SDN controller
Notation:
P Client request (e.g. flow request) initiated at switch SC
C The set of available SDN controllers
Ci The local controller instance
Cr The remote controller instance
RmajP,Si Majority configuration for switch Si
RP Buffer containing controller responses for request P
Ap Set of primary controller-switch assignments
As Set of secondary controller-switch assignments
ASi,Ci Connection assignment variable for controller-
switch pair (Si, Ci)
1: procedure HANDLE CLIENT REQUEST
2: upon event packet-in < SC , P > do
3: RP := handle-packet-in (P )
4: signal (C, response-sync< Ci, RP >)
5:
6: upon event response-sync < Cr, RP > do
7: RP ← RP∪ < Cr, RP >
8: if is-sda-consensus-reached(RP ) then
9: RmajP :=majority-response(RP )
10: for all Si ∈ affected-switches(RmajP ) do
11: if mode == non-selective then
12: if ASi,Ci ∈ Ap ∪ As then
13: signal (Si, response < Ci, R
maj
P,Si
>)
14: else if mode == selective then
15: if ASi,Ci ∈ Ap then
16: signal (Si, response < Ci, R
maj
P,Si
>)
17: else if ASi,Ci ∈ As then
18: store-secondary-response(RmajP,Si)
19:
20: upon event response-request < Si, P > do
21: signal (Si, response < Ci, R
maj
P,Si
>)
not exceed the difference of the total available controller’s
capacity and the sum of the constant loads stemming from
the northbound clients (ref. Sec. V):∑
Sj∈S
APCi,Sj ∗ LSj +
∑
Sj∈S
ASCi,Sj ∗ LSj ≤
PCi −
∑
CLk∈CL
LCLk ,∀Ci ∈ C
(5)
Delay Bound Constraint: We assume well-defined worst-
case upper bounds for the unidirectional delays in controller-
to-switch and controller-to-controller communication. Let
dCi,Sj and dCi,Cj denote the guaranteed worst-case expe-
rienced delay for the controller-switch pair (Ci, Sj) and
controller-controller pair (Ci, Cj), respectively. Given a max-
imum tolerable global upper bound delays DC,S and DC,C ,
we define the related constraints as:
APCi,Sj ∗ dCi,Sj ≤ DC,S ,∀Ci ∈ C, Sj ∈ S
ASCi,Sj ∗ dCi,Sj ≤ DC,S ,∀Ci ∈ C, Sj ∈ S
dCi,Cj ≤ DC,C ,∀Ci ∈ C \ Cj , Cj ∈ C \ Ci
(6)
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Algorithm 4 S-COMPARATOR: Processing of controller con-
figuration messages in the switch
Notation:
ReqP No. of required PRIMARY controllers per switch
ReqS No. of req. SECONDARY controllers per switch
RP The set of received responses for client request P
ASip Set of PRIMARY controllers assigned to switch Si
ASis Set of SECONDARY controllers assigned to Si
Z The set of designated shufflers assigned to switch Si
1: procedure COMPARE AND APPLY CONTROLLER CON-
FIGURATIONS
2: upon event receive-response< Cj , RP > do
3: RP ← RP∪ < Cj , RP >
4: if Cj ∈ ASip then
5: if |RP | == ReqP then
6: Rmajority := majority-responses(RP )
7: if |Rmajority| ≥ ReqP then
8: apply (Rmajority)
9: else
10: signal(ASis , response-request < Si, P >)
11: else if Cj ∈ ASip ∪ASis then
12: if ReqP < |RP | ≤ ReqP +ReqS then
13: Rmajority := majority-responses(RP )
14: if |Rmajority| ≥ ReqP then
15: apply (Rmajority)
16: for all < Ci, Ri >∈ RP do
17: if Ri /∈ Rmajority then
18: Cincnst ← Cincnst ∪ Ci
19: if Ci 6= ∅ then
20: signal (Z, suspect-byzant < Cincnst >)
21: else
22: drop-response(RP )
23:
24: upon event controller-failed< Cj > do
25: signal (Z, controller-failed < Cj >)
C. Communication and Computation Complexity Analysis
TABLE I
NOTATION USED IN SPECIFICATION OF THE COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
Notation Property
CLI2S Communication channels between clients and switches
S2C Upstream communication channels between switches and controllers
C2C Controller to controller communication channels
C2S Downstream communication channels between controllers and switches
C2S Downstream communication channels between controllers and switches
m Total number of data plane clients in the network
µcli The average request rate of data plane clients
|Scli| The average number of affected switches by data plane client’s requests
|C| The total number of controllers, |C| ≥ 2FM + FA + 1
fM,A the current number of failed controllers
E Equal to 1/0 if MORPH is in NON-SELECTIVE/SELECTIVE mode
Henceforth we analyze the communication overhead im-
posed by MORPH framework when handling data plane
clients only (NBI clients are excluded for brevity). Multiple
communication channels are present in the system:
• CLI2S: Every request generated by a data plane client
is first forwarded to the corresponding edge switch,
therefore, if the average request generation rate of m
data plane clients is µcli, then mµcli is the total request
generation rate on client to switch channels (i.e., CLI2S).
• S2C: Upon receiving the request, the edge switch for-
wards it to its PRIMARY and SECONDARY controllers,
hence, the total message rate on the upstream com-
munication channels between switches and controllers
is (ReqP + ReqS)mµcli. In the best-case, all faulty
controllers were detected, hence the total number of
PRIMARY and SECONDARY controllers is reduced to
ReqP = 1 and ReqS = 0, while in the worst-case none
of the faulty controllers failed yet, i.e., the inital values
still hold ReqP = FM + 1 and ReqS = FM + FA.
• C2C: For every request received from the switches,
its PRIMARY and SECONDARY controllers calculate
the corresponding response (i.e., a forwarding path) and
forward it to all of the other available (non-faulty)
controllers in the network (i.e., |C| − fM,A − 1). The
total dynamic rate rate on the controller to controller
channel is (|C| − fM,A − 1)(ReqP + ReqS)mµcli. In
the best-case, all failed controllers were detected, thus
fM,A = FM + FA, however, in the worst-case, none of
the controllers failed, i.e., fM,A = 0.
• C2S: After the consensus is reached for the correspond-
ing request, in the case of NON-SELECTIVE mode
all PRIMARY and SECONDARY controllers issue the
reconfiguration responses to all affected switches (i.e.,
variable is E = 1), while in the SELECTIVE mode, only
PRIMARY controllers issue the responses (i.e., E = 0).
If we consider that on average |Scli| switches are recon-
figured based on the clients requests, the total number
of responses issued by controllers towards switches is
|Scli|(ReqP +EReqS)mµcli. In the best-case, all faulty
controllers were detected (i.e., ReqP = 1) and the work-
ing mode is SELECTIVE E = 0, thus only |Scli|mµcli
messages are needed. While in the worst-case, the initial
case, ReqP = FM + 1, E = 1, ReqS = FM + FA + 1.
The summary of the communication overhead is presented
in Table II, with corresponding notation summarized in I. Table
II also presents the required number of messages in case when
there is no fault-tolerance, i.e., in this case we assume that the
network is handled by a single SDN controller. Furthermore,
we also present the communication overhead specific to the
design presented in a related work [13]. It can be observed that
MORPH requires the same or lower amount of messages on
CLI2S, S2C, C2S channels depending on the current network
state. Furthermore, as mentioned in the Sec. IV, controller-to-
controller communication was not discussed in [13], thus SDA
are not correctly handled as in the case of MORPH.
VII. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
In this section we present our evaluation methodology
including the target SDN application, the evaluated topolo-
gies and the overall scenario. Furthermore, we elaborate our
emulation approach in more detail.
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TABLE II
EXCHANGED NUMBER OF MESSAGES ON EACH COMMUNICATION CHANNEL
Channel MORPH Best-Case MORPH Worst-Case MORPH No Fault-Tolerance [13]
CLI2S mµcli mµcli mµcli mµcli mµcli
S2C (ReqP +ReqS)mµcli mµcli (2FM + FA + 1)mµcli mµcli (2(FM + FA) + 1)mµcli
C2C (|C| − fM,A − 1)(ReqP +ReqS)mµcli (|C| − FM − FA − 1)mµcli (|C| − 1)(2FM + FA + 1)mµcli - -
C2S |Scli|(ReqP + EReqS)mµcli |Scli|mµcli |Scli|(2FM + FA + 1)mµcli |Scli|mµcli |Scli|(2(FM + FA) + 1)mµcli
A. Application model
For our SDN application we have implemented a centralized
resource-based path finding application, based on Dijkstra’s
algorithm [36]. We deploy the routing application once per
each controller instance, so to cater to the SPOF issue.
In the case of SIA realization, the weight of each link
is set to a constant link delay value corresponding to the
propagation delay. Hence, the application is stateless and
computes the same shortest path between two arbitrary hosts as
long as no topology changes occur. Thus, as soon as our SDN
controller application receives a client request, it computes
the new path, signals the path configuration (i.e. OpenFlow
FlowMod updates) to the affected switches, and notifies the
other controllers for state synchronization purposes.
For the SDA case, we consider load-balanced routing where
the cost of each link depends on the current link load. A
correct distribution of switch configuration thus necessitates a
consensus across the set of correct SDN controllers, so in order
to omit the overloading of particular links (ref. Sec. V-D).
B. Scenarios
To validate our claims in a realistic environment, we have
emulated the Internet2 Network Infrastructure Topology1, as
well as a standard fat-tree data-center topology. Both topolo-
gies are depicted in Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b, respectively. The
evaluated Internet2 and fat-tree topologies encompass 34 and
20 switches, respectively. We have enabled a configuration of
MORPH to support up to FM = 5 and FA = 5 availability-
related controller failures. Thus, to allow for a Byzantine fault-
tolerant operation, 2FM + FA + 1 = 16 controller processes
were deployed. We varied FM and FA individually from 1
to 5, so to allow for an evaluation of the overhead of added
robustness against either type of failure. The overhead of our
design scales with the arbitrary number of tolerated failures
FM and FA and is independent of the number of deployed
switches. Each SDN controller implements the logic to execute
the routing task as well as the C-COMPARATOR compo-
nent that compares the controller-to-controller synchronization
inputs and notifies the switches of new path configurations.
An S-COMPARATOR agent is hosted inside each switch
instance, and is enabled to listen for remote connections. All
communication channels (ref. Fig. 2) are realized using TCP
with enabled Nagle’s algorithm [37].
A realistic, in-band control plane channel was realized
at all times. To realize the switching plane, a number of
interconnected Open vSwitch2 v2.8.2 virtual switches were
1Internet2 Advanced Networking - https://www.internet2.edu/
products-services/advanced-networking/
2Open vSwitch - https://www.openvswitch.org/
(a) Internet2 topology [38]
(b) Fat-tree topology [39]
Fig. 4. Exemplary network topologies and controller placements used in the
evaluation of MORPH. Elements highlighted in green and blue represent the
switches and clients, respectively. Red elements are the controller instances
placed as per [38], [39]. Each switch instance in the Internet2 topology is
allocated a client, while the fat-tree topology hosts clients at the leaf switches.
instantiated and isolated in individual Docker containers. To
reflect the delays incurred by the length of the optical links in
the geographically scattered Internet2 topology, we assume a
travel speed of light of 2 · 106km/s in the optical fiber links.
We then derive the link distances from the publicly available
geographical Internet2 data3 and inject the propagation delays
using Linux’s Traffic Control (tc) tool. The links of the fat-
tree topology only posses the inherit processing and queuing
delays. The arrival rates of the incoming service embedding re-
quests were modeled using a negative exponential distribution
[39]. In the fat-tree topology, each leaf-switch was connected
to 2 client instances, bringing the total number of clients up
to 16. The Internet2 topology deployed one client per switch.
Controller placement: In the Internet2 topology, we leverage
a controller placement that allows for a high robustness against
the controller failures. We consider the exemplary placements
introduced in [38]. Since the accompanying controller place-
ment framework4 was unable to solve the placement problem
for a very high number of controllers (i.e. up to 16 in our
case), we have executed the problem by placing up to 5
3Internet2 topological data (provided by POCO project) - https://github.
com/lsinfo3/poco/tree/master/topologies
4Pareto Optimal Controller Placement (POCO) GitHub - https://github.com/
lsinfo3/poco
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controllers multiple times for the same topology, targeting dif-
ferent optimization objectives (incl. response time, maximized
coverage in the case of failures, load balancing etc.). We then
ranked the unique nodes based on their placement preference
and have selected the highest-ranked 16 nodes to host the
MORPH controller processes. We make a note here that the
optimality of controller placement decisions is orthogonal to
the issue solved in this paper, and was thus not considered
crucial for our evaluation. The resulting controller placement
is depicted in Fig. 4a. The SDN controller replicas in the data-
center topology were deployed on the leaf-nodes, similar to the
controller placement presented in [39].
TABLE III
PARAMETERS USED IN EVALUATION OF MORPH IMPLEMENTATION
Parameter Intensity Unit Meaning
FM [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] N/A Max. no. of Byzantine failures
FA [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] N/A Max. no. of availability failures
|C| [4, 7, 10, 13, 16] N/A No. of deployed controllers
1/λFM [5, 10, 15, 20] [s] Byzantine failure rate
1/λFA [5, 10, 15, 20] [s] Availability failure rate
S [0, 1] N/A SIA/SDA operation
E [0, 1] N/A NON-SELECTIVE/SELECTIVE
T internet2, fat-tree N/A Topology type
To evaluate the effect of the number, ratio and order of the
Byzantine and availability-type failures, we deploy a special-
ized fault injection component. The fault injection component
generates the faults in any of the available SDN controller
processes using an out-of-band management channel. The
targeted active controllers are faulted with uniform probability.
The ratio of failure injections is manipulated by specifying
the maximum amount of individual type of failures (ref. Table
III). The ordering of the different failure type injections is
governed by the parametrization of mean arrival times as
specified in Table III. The intensity of failures follows the
negative exponential distribution (similar to [19], [40]).
The Docker- and OVS-based topology emulator, the RE-
ASSIGNER as well as up to 16 C-COMPARATOR and
34 S-COMPARATOR processes were deployed on a single
commodity PC running a recent multi-core AMD Ryzen 1600
CPU and 32 GB of DDR4 RAM. We have used Gurobi
Optimizer5 to solve the ILP formulated in Sec. VI-B.
VIII. RESULTS
A. Overhead minimization by successful failure detection
Fig. 5 depicts the observed controller-to-controller (C2C)
state reconfiguration and switch-reconfiguration (C2S) delays,
before, during and following the failure injection process.
Similarly, the packet load and total system CPU utilization
are depicted for the same measurement. Fig. 5 a) depicts
the convergence time to the globally consistent state in the
replicated controller database. The Best-Case considers the
time required to replicate and commit a state update in at least
two controllers, while the Worst-Case considers the outcome
where every controller converges to the globally consistent
state. We observe that the initial failure injections consistently
5Gurobi Optimizer - http://www.gurobi.com/products/gurobi-optimizer
decrease the expected waiting time to achieve consensus and
converge the state updates for the worst-case. The detection of
later injections (Injection 5 and 6) has a lesser effect. For those
detections, the trade-off in the added C2C delay overrides
the benefits of the lower amount of controller confirmations
required to update the controller state on each instance. This
is a consequence of the displacement of the remaining active
controllers in the Internet2 topology and hence the added
controller-to-controller delay.
Fig. 5 b) depicts a drastic decrease in the response time re-
quired to handle client requests, i.e., to reconfigure each switch
on the identified path with the new flow rules. We observe that
dynamically decreasing the minimum number of controllers
needed to reach consensus on the correct configuration update,
consistently lowers the expected time to reconfigure both the
control and data plane. Thus, the overall throughput of the
SDN control plane is increased, as additional service requests
may be served in the same amount of time.
Similarly, the exclusion of incorrect controllers from the
message comparison procedure consistently lowers the experi-
enced control plane packet and CPU load over the observation
period. The exclusion of the controller instances, specifically,
has a benefit on the minimization of the number of C2C
synchronization messages, as can be observed from the change
in the arrival slope in Fig. 5 c). The total CPU load is similarly
decreased with each successfully identified controller fault, as
both controller and switches must process a lower total amount
of controller messages with each controller exclusion. We have
observed identical trends for the fat-tree topology.
Note that in static controller-to-switch assignment, the de-
picted downward slopes would be non-existent, i.e., a compa-
rable design [13], [14] with static cluster configuration would
not lead to a noticeable decrease in either CPU load or
the switch/controller response times, even after the discovery
of the faulty controller instances. This is in part because
the mentioned comparable designs tend to ignore controller
messages after detecting a Byzantine fault, instead of fully
excluding the controllers from the actual cluster configuration.
Fig. 6 depicts the benefits of distinguishing the type of
failure when reducing the number of active controllers used in
the consensus procedure. According to Alg. 1, two message
exchanges less are required to identify the correct message
after detection of a malicious controller (FM ), while a single
message less is required after discovery of an unavailable
controller (FA). Successful detection of Byzantine controllers
thus leads to a lower average C2S and C2C reconfiguration
time, compared to a discovery of the same amount of failures
of a different type (or a combination of different faults). The
detection of an availability failure (FA) hence provides less
information about the failed controller being either benign or
malicious. In that case, the REASSIGNER is more conserva-
tive when computing new controller-switch assignments.
B. Impact of SDN application statefulness
Fig. 7 depicts the consequence of the complexity of stateful-
ness of the distributed SDN control plane on the experienced
C2C controller- and C2S switch-reconfiguration delays (Fig.
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Fig. 5. Successful detection of injected Byzantine and availability failures leads to an instant decrease in: a) the experienced controller-to-controller (C2C)
delay, both for the duration of the best- and worst-case state convergence time; b) the switch reconfiguration delay; c) the measured C2C and controller-
to-switch (C2S) packet arrivals (measured at the ingress of a correct controller and switch, respectively); and d) the total measured system CPU load. The
depicted measurements are taken in the Internet2 topology, based on 13 controllers and 34 switches. The particular sample shown here depicts the case where
4 Byzantine and 2 availability failures are identified in the depicted order (red and blue vertical dashed lines, respectively).
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Fig. 6. The type of the failure affects considerably the experienced controller-to-controller delay (depicted in Fig. 6 (a)). Indeed, the larger the number
of detected Byzantine controller failures, the lower the instantaneous total number of PRIMARY controller messages required to process and commit new
controller state update. Interestingly, the trend is observable for the switch configuration delay as well (depicted in Fig. 6 (b)), but not with the same intensity.
The depicted figures result from the measurements taken for the Internet2 topology comprised of 13 controllers and 34 switches. The observation period
includes the time preceding, during and following the successful failure injections.
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(c) Fat-Tree: Switch Reconfiguration Delay
Fig. 7. Depending on an SDN application’s requirement for access to
the consistent controller data-store, controllers impose a varying controller-
to-controller synchronization load. Specifically in the case of resource-
reservation applications, knowledge about the reserved and free resources is
a requirement for the efficient client request processing (i.e. slicing, path
embedding, load-balancing algorithms that rely on resource reservations).
S = 1 denotes the case for a stateful controller application, while S = 0
denotes applications which do not demand causality in controller updates.
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Fig. 8. Difference in the observed switch reconfiguration delay for NON-
SELECTIVE and SELECTIVE propagation of SECONDARY controller con-
figurations in the [7..16] controller topology that tolerates max(FM+FA) =
[4..10] controller failures. Deployment of a large control plane induces a
benefit in the average configuration time with the NON-SELECTIVE model.
In a topology comprising a smaller number of controllers, the additional
system workload related with the propagation of configurations on every
SECONDARY controller negatively affects the overall performance.
7 a) and Fig. 7 b), respectively). Stateful SDA applications
necessitate consensus, which imposes an additional waiting
time in the C2C synchronization. With consensus, the majority
of controller configurations must match before deciding on
the configuration message to be delivered to switch. After
the consensus is reached, the controllers’ data-stores converge
to a consistent state in each correct controller replica. The
difference in the waiting time is not reflected in the data plane
(switch) as much as in the C2C communication, since the
switch experiences a constant waiting time for the minimum
amount of required replicas ReqP , independent of the time it
takes to reach consensus in the C2C communication.
However, as depicted both in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, the overhead
in the controller state and switch reconfiguration time is
intensified by the maximum number of tolerated failures. The
more failures the system is designed to tolerate, the higher
the amount of required comparisons across the PRIMARY
messages in order to forward the system state. We conclude
that the experienced controller and switch reconfiguration
times scale with the number of tolerated controller failures.
C. Impact of proactive propagation of switch configurations
Fig. 8 depicts the measurements taken in the fat-tree topol-
ogy comprising 7 to 16 SDN controller instances and 20
switches. A trend reversal in the switch reconfiguration delay
can be observed, where for small-sized controller clusters (i.e.
4..10 controllers), the usage of the SELECTIVE mode (E = 1)
results in a lower configuration delay overall. For large-scale
control planes (13..16 controllers), the trend is reversed and
the NON-SELECTIVE mode (E = 0) becomes faster. We
assume that the trend reversal is linked to the fact that in
the average case where no failures are detected, SELECTIVE
mode is more efficient than the NON-SELECTIVE one, since
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Fig. 9. Decrease in the total execution time of the ILP solver for the
controller-to-switch connection reassignment procedure. The controller-switch
assigment (re-)computations consider 0 − 10 failure detections and were
executed in an emulated 34-switch, 16-controller Internet2 network topology.
The time required for the REASSIGNER to reconfigure the control plane
scales inversely with the number of successfully identified controller faults.
As the REASSIGNER tasks may execute asynchronously, without negatively
disturbing the system correctness or control plane availability, we consider the
deployment of MORPH in critical operation networks for practically feasible.
no additional packet overhead / CPU load is generated during
the message processing, both in the control and data plane.
In the large-scale control plane, the controller placement has
a dominant role, so that the decrease in the controller-switch
distance dominates the additional load related to the higher
number of controller instances. For client requests where some
controllers send their malicious configurations to the switches,
or fail-silently and thus do not deliver any new configuration
messages, the switch is able to deduce the correct majority
only after experiencing an additional round-trip to collect
additional configuration responses from the SECONDARY
controllers. The NON-SELECTIVE model is intuitively faster
in its worst-case, as it propagates every controller response
directly to the switch after the computation of the configuration
response, independent of the controller’s role as PRIMARY or
SECONDARY. Thus, no additional switch-controller round-
trip delays are experienced when the received messages at
the switch are inconsistent. Similarly, the switch is capable
of collecting the ReqP consistent messages faster on average,
since SECONDARY controllers may potentially deliver new
configurations faster than the assigned PRIMARY instances.
D. Controller-switch reassignment time
The ILP solver is executed once after the initial system
deployment (to compute the initial switch-controller assign-
ments) and once after each controller failure detection. Fig. 9
depicts a constant decrease in the execution time of the ILP
as new faults are injected and failures are observed at the
REASSIGNER. Indeed, the exclusion of incorrect controllers
from the parameter space decreases the total running time of
the ILP solver. Nevertheless, even in a large-scale formulation
that assumes the assignment of 16 controller replicas to 34
switches, the REASSIGNER requires only up to ∼ 540ms to
compute the optimal assignment w.r.t. delay and bandwidth
constraints. Hence, MORPH supports the real-time switch re-
assignment and is thus deployable in online operation as well.
For higher-scaled networks we do not foresee any limitations
in the reassignment procedure related to the viability of our
solution. Namely, when an inconsistency in the PRIMARY
configuration messages is detected in the S-COMPARATOR,
the switch initially ignores the inconsistent messages and
continues to autonomously contact the SECONDARY replicas
to request additional confirmation messages. Thus, the correct-
ness of the system is never endangered and the REASSIGNER
may proceed with its reassignment optimization procedure
asynchronously in the background. MORPH is hence suitable
for operation in critical networks where minimal downtime is
a necessary prerequisite (e.g., in industrial control networks).
IX. CONCLUSION
MORPH allows for distinguishing malicious/unreliable
from unavailable controllers during runtime, as well as for
their dynamic exclusion from the system configuration. In
general, enabling Byzantine Fault Tolerance results in a rel-
atively high system footprint in the network phase where
no Byzantine or availability-related failures are identified.
However, in the critical infrastructure networks, such as the
industrial networks, this overhead may be unavoidable.
Following a Byzantine or availability-induced SDN con-
troller failure, MORPH allows for an autonomous adaptation
of the system configuration and minimization of the distributed
control plane overhead. By experimental validation, we have
proven that MORPH achieves a performance improvement in
both average- and worst-case system response time by mini-
mizing the amount of required / considered controllers when
deducing new configurations. Thus, the worst-case waiting
periods required to confirm new controller state updates and
switch configurations are substantially reduced over time. Fur-
thermore, by excluding faulty controllers, the average packet
and CPU loads incurred by the generation and transfer of con-
troller messages to the switches are reduced. We have shown
that the ILP formulation for QoS-constrained reassignment
of controller-to-switch relationships may execute online, for
both medium- and large-scale control planes comprising up
to 16 controller instances. The time required to re-adapt the
system configuration scales proportionally with the number
of successfully detected faulted controllers. Apart from the
minimal additional CPU load related to the dynamic reas-
signment of controller connections, average- and worst-case
computational and communication overheads are lower than
those of comparable BFT SDN designs.
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